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Abstract: Empirical evidence suggests that the size of the informal sector in the developing 
countries has increased considerably during the liberalized economic regime.  The present 
paper purports to analyze the consequences of economic reforms on the wellbeing of the 
informal sector workforce using a three-sector general equilibrium model with two informal 
sectors. The theoretical analysis finds that different liberalized policies produce diverse 
effects on the informal wage and that these results are independent of the nature of capital 
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ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION AND INFORMAL WAGE IN A SMALL OPEN 
ECONOMY: DOES CAPITAL MOBILITY COUNT? 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Informal labour market characterized by competitive wage formation rather than unionized 
process of negotiations has emerged as an important institution in the entire developing 
world. It is beyond any doubt that the informal sector plays a very significant role in 
employment in developing countries constituting at least 70 per cent of total employment of 
the working population (Agenor 1996). In case of India this figure is over 90 per cent if one 
includes agriculture. The informal economy absorbs surplus labour, provides income-earning 
opportunities for the poor, provides goods and services unavailable in the formal sector, and 
helps in maintaining a low cost of living by providing cheaper sources of food and services. 
Early research on the informal sector showed that its primary role was to provide a livelihood 
for the urban poor while later studies showed that informal economy fulfils other crucial roles 
that aid overall economic development. 
 
The ongoing process of economic reforms has increased significantly the role played by 
informal sectors in determining the pattern of employment in the developing countries. Many 
of the developing countries have been facing substantial adjustment costs in implementing 
economic liberalization programs, particularly in the employment front. Empirical evidence 
suggests that in South Africa and in many of the Latin American and other developing 
countries, trade liberalization during 1990s was associated with falling employment and hence 
economic insecurity for the formal sector labour force (ILO (2006)). Reformatory policies 
contract the formal manufacturing sector and drive labour out into the informal segment of the 
labour market. Empirical studies e.g. Bhalotra (2002), Dev (2000), ILO (2006) and Leite 
(2006) have reported that the size of the informal sector in the developing countries has 
increased considerably in the post-reform period. But the expanding informal sector has not 
been able to absorb the huge number of retrenched workers from the formal sector. The 
consequence has been a steep rise in the level of open unemployment in many of the 
developing economies. 
 
When the size of the informal sector in the developing countries is increasing at a brisk pace, 
it is important to know how the liberalized economic policies have affected the working 
conditions and welfare of the informal sector workforce. As economic wellbeing of the 
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workers and wage earnings are strongly correlated, the issue boils down to the study of the 
consequences of economic reforms on the informal sector wage. There are not enough direct 
empirical evidences as yet in understanding clearly the direction of movement of the informal 
sector wages in response to economic reforms. While Bhalotra (2002) and National Sample 
Survey (NSS), various issues data for informal manufacturing for 1989-1990 and 1994-1995, 
state that the real wage in the informal manufacturing sector has increased in the period of 
reforms, empirical studies of Khan (1998) and Tendulkar et al. (1996) have found that the 
incidence of poverty has increased in India in the post-reform period. As informal sector 
workers belong to the poorer section of the population, an increase in poverty implies 
deterioration in their wage earnings. Besides, Leite et al. (2006) have reported a significant 
decrease in average real wage for informal workers in South Africa during 2000-2004. 
 
The enormous theoretical literature on the informal sector1 has not adequately addressed this 
aspect. An important exception in this context is Marjit (2003) who has examined the 
outcome of trade liberalization on the informal wage using a three-sector general equilibrium 
model with two informal sectors. In his model one of the two informal sectors produces a 
non-traded input for the formal sector and capital is mobile only between the two informal 
sectors of the economy. Marjit (2003) has found that trade liberalization may increase the 
informal sector wage under certain conditions. He argues that the positive effect on the 
informal wage would be strengthened if capital mobility between the informal and the formal 
sectors is allowed. 
 
It should be pointed out that economic reforms involve not only removal of the protectionist 
policy but also liberalized investment policy resulting in inflows of foreign capital and also 
structural reforms like deregulating the labour market. But, liberalization of labour laws is a 
very much politically sensitive issue. It is apprehended by the trade unions that any relaxation 
of labour laws will lead to general wage reductions of the poorer group of the working population 
engaged in the informal sector of the economy2. Two other important aspects in this context 
                                                 
1 This includes works of Chandra and Khan (1993), Gupta (1993, 1997), Beladi and Yabuuchi 
(2001), Kar and Marjit (2001), Chaudhuri (2000, 2003), Chaudhuri and Mukherjee (2002), 
Chaudhuri et al. (2006), etc. But, none of these papers has exclusively examined the 
consequences of economic reforms on the wage rate and the wellbeing of the informal sector 
labour force and the role of the capital mobility between the formal and the informal sectors 
in this context.  
 
2 Many of the developing countries, including India, are now seriously thinking in terms of 
implementing labour market reforms. But, not much progress has been made so far toward 
implementation of such a highly politically sensitive measure and hence the outcome of this 
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are the empirical findings that the informal sector firms mainly produce intermediate inputs 
for the formal sector firms under the system of subcontracting and that capital is mobile 
between these two types of firms3. Three pertinent questions, therefore, are as follows: (i) Do 
different liberalized policies produce dissimilar effects on the informal wage? (ii) How far is 
the general apprehension that labour market reforms depress the informal wage valid? (iii) Do 
the consequences of economic reform really hinge on the nature of capital mobility between 
the formal and the informal sectors of the economy?  
 
The present paper purports to provide answers to the above questions in terms of a three-
sector general equilibrium model with two informal sectors. It finds that different liberalized 
policies produce dissimilar effects on the informal wage and that these results are independent 
of the nature of capital mobility between the formal and the informal sectors. It also shows 
that the fear of the trade unions surrounding the possible impact of labour market reforms 
does not have sound theoretical foundation. Labour market reform in fact is likely to increase 
the competitive informal wage and improve the wellbeing of the poorer section of the 
working class. Finally, as different liberalized policies produce incongruent consequences on 
the informal wage, the paper argues that unless a proper balance among different policies 
compatible to the internal institutional, technological and trade related characteristics is made 
drastic implementation of economic measures may produce adverse effects on the informal 
wage and further exacerbate the already fragile economic situations of the informal sector 
workers.  
 
2.  The Model 
 
We consider a small open economy with three sectors: two traded sectors and one non-traded 
sector. Sector 1 produces a primary agricultural commodity, 1X , using labour and land. Sector 
2 produces a non-traded input for sector 3 using labour and one of the two inputs: land and 
capital. Finally, sector 3 (formal sector) may be either an agro-based industry or a 
manufacturing industry that uses labour, capital and the product of sector 2 to produce a final 
industrial commodity. So, we consider two cases depending on the nature of good produced 
by sector 3. In the former case, sector 2 produces a commercial agricultural crop for the 
formal sector using only labour and land while in the latter it produces a manufacturing 
                                                                                                                                            
on the unionized wage cannot be statistically established a priori. However, it follows 
logically that such a move is likely to lower the unionized wage. See footnote 6 for details.   
 
3 See Papola (1981), Romatet (1983), Sethuraman (1984), Sethuraman and Maldonado (1992) 
etc. in this context. 
 5
intermediate input with the help of labour and capital. However, for constructing a general 
model from which the two cases arise as sub-cases we assume that sector 2 uses both land and 
capital in its production. Sector 1 is the export sector while sector 3 is the import-competing 
which is protected by an import-tariff.  
 
The per-unit requirement of the intermediate input is assumed to be technologically fixed in 
sector 3.4 Let us now assume that labour in the formal sector earns a contractual wage, *W , 
while the wage rate in the two informal sectors,W , is market determined. So, labour is 
perfectly mobile between the two informal sectors but is imperfectly mobile between sector 3 
and the rest of the economy. Land (capital) is perfectly mobile between sector 1 (sector 3) and 
sector 2 if sector 2 uses land (capital) while it is specific to sector 1 (sector 3) in the case 
where sector 2 produces a manufacturing (an agricultural) input for sector 3. The capital stock 
of the economy includes both domestic and foreign capital and these are perfect substitutes. 
Production functions exhibit constant returns to scale with diminishing marginal productivity 
to each factor. All inputs are fully employed. Owing to our small open economy assumption 
we consider the prices of the commodities of sectors 1 and 3 to be given internationally while 
the price of the non-traded input produced in sector 2 is endogenously determined. Finally, 
commodity 1 is chosen as the numeraire.  
 
The following symbols will be used in the formal presentation of the model.  
 
L  = fixed number of workers in the economy; 
N = economy’s given endowment of land; 
=K capital stock of the economy (domestic plus foreign); 
iX  = output of the i th sector, i  = 1,2,3; 
                                                 
4 It rules out the possibility of substitution between the non-traded input and other factors of 
production in sector 3. Although this is a simplifying assumption, it is not totally unrealistic. 
In industries like shoe making and garments, large formal sector firms farm out their 
production to small informal sector firms under the system of subcontracting. So the 
production is done in the informal sector while labeling, packaging and marketing are done by 
the formal sector firms. One pair of shoes produced in the informal sector does not change in 
quantity when it is marketed by the formal sector as a final commodity. Thus there remains a 
fixed proportion between the use of the intermediate good and the quantity of the final 
commodity produced and marketed by the formal sector. On the other hand, if sector 2 
produces an agricultural product like sugarcane or cotton, there might exist a fixed-proportion 
between the quantity of input used and the quantity of output produced in the sugar 
mills/textile firms.  It may be noted that papers like Chaudhuri (2003), Marjit (2003) and 
Chaudhuri et al. (2006) have also made this assumption.  
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=ij amount of the j -th input employed in the i -th industry, KNLj ,,= ;  and, ;3,2,1=i   
Lia  = labour-output ratio in the ith sector, i  = 1,2,3; 
=Nia land-output ratio in the ith sector, i  = 1,2; 
=Kia  capital-output ratio in the ith sector, =i 2,3; 
=23a amount of good 2 required to produce 1 unit of good 3 (technologically given); 
jiθ = distributive share of the j -th input in the i -th industry, KNLj ,,= ;  and, ;3,2,1=i  
jiλ = proportion of the j -th input employed in the i -th industry, KNLj ,,= ;  and, 
;3,2,1=i  
=1P 1 (commodity 1 is the numeraire); 
=3P world price of good 3 (given internationally); 
=2P  domestically determined price of good 2; 
=*3P  domestic or tariff-inclusive price of commodity 3; 
t  =  ad-valorem rate of tariff on the import of commodity 3; 
=W  competitive wage rate in the informal sectors; 
=*W  institutionally given wage rate in the formal sector; 
=R   return to land; 
=r  return to capital; 
=^ proportional change. 
 
The general equilibrium structure of the model is as follows.  
 
Given the assumption of perfectly competitive markets the usual price-unit cost equality 
conditions relating to the three sectors of the economy are given by the following three 
equations, respectively. 
111 =+ NL RaWa                                                                                                           (1)     
2222 PraRaWa KNL =++                                                                                              (2) 
)1(323233
* tPaPraaW KL +=++                                                                                  (3) 
 
Full utilization of labour, land and capital imply the following three equations, respectively.           
 
LXaXaXa LLL =++ 332211                                                                                          (4)           
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NXaXa NN =+ 2211       (5)           
;3322 KXaXa KK =+                  (6) 
 
The output of the informal sector, 2X , is used entirely for producing 3X , so that the supply 
of 2X is circumscribed by its total demand by sector 3. The demand – supply equality 
condition is given by 
32322 XaXX
D ==                                                                                                            (7) 
Here, 23a  is assumed to be a constant. This means that to produce one unit of the formal 
sector’s product 23a units of the non-traded input is required.
5 
 
There are seven endogenous variables in the system: rRW ,, , 212 ,, XXP and .3X The policy 
parameters are: *,Wt and K . There are seven independent equations (1) – (7). The price 
system consists of equations (1) – (3). The model does not satisfy the decomposition property. 
The working of the model is as follows. RW , and r are obtained from equations (1) – (3) as 
functions of 2P  as 3*, PW and t  are given exogenously. Once factor prices are determined 
factor-coefficients, jia s, are also determined as functions of 2P . Then from (4) – 
(6), 21 , XX and 3X are obtained. Finally, 2P is found from (7). Once 2P is obtained the 
equilibrium values of all the endogenous variables are now found in terms of the parameters 
of the model. 
 
 
3.   Comparative Static Exercises 
 
In this section of the paper we will analyze the consequences of different liberalized economic 
policies on the informal sector wage. Liberalization involves both inflow of foreign capital as 
well as reduction of protection of domestic industries and structural reforms like deregulating 
the labour market. According to the conventional wisdom, an inflow of foreign capital in a 
developing economy should raise the competitive wage through an expansion of the formal 
sector of the economy and drawing labour away from the informal sector while removal of 
the protectionist policy is expected to produce exactly the opposite effects. On the other hand, 
                                                 
5 See footnote 4 in this context. 
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labour market reform that lowers the unionized wage6 in the formal sector is apprehended to 
produce adverse impact on the informal wage and deteriorate welfare of the poorer section of 
the working population engaged in the informal sector of the economy.  Although, different 
liberalized policies are undertaken concurrently in a developing economy, to fix our ideas we 
may consider their effects one by one. We shall, however, discuss intuitively the net outcome 
of these policies on the informal sector wage, if carried out simultaneously.  
 
3.1  Economic liberalization and informal wage 
 
Totally differentiating equations (1) – (3), using the envelope conditions and solving by 
Cramer’s rule, the following expressions can be derived easily. 
]ˆˆˆ))[((ˆ *32222233
1 WtTPW LKKKKN θθθθθθθ
θ +−+−=                                                 (8)                                   
]ˆˆˆ))[((ˆ *322222331 WtTPR LKKKKL θθθθθθθ
θ +−+=                                       (9)                      
)ˆˆˆ(
)(ˆ *3223
2121 WPtTr LLNNL θθθ
θθθθ −−−=                                                      (10)           
where: 
;0)
1
( >+= t
tT and, 
)( 212!3 LNNLK θθθθθθ −=                                                                            (11) 
 
Now differentiating equations (4) – (6), using (8) – (10) and solving the following expressions 
can be obtained.          
                                                 
6 The firms in the urban (manufacturing) sector have well-organized trade unions. One of the 
most important roles of the labour unions is to bargain with the respective employers in 
respect of the betterment of the working conditions. Through offer of negotiation, threat of 
strike, actual strike etc. they exert pressure on the employers (firms) in order to secure higher 
wages, reduced hours of work, share in profits and other benefits. Bhalotra (2002) has noted 
that in India before the initiation of economic reforms organized workers in large firms were 
been able to reap wages higher than the supply price of labour due to the job security and 
minimum wage legislations. The higher the bargaining strength of the unions the higher is 
expected to be the extent of benefits that can be wrested through collective-bargaining. Now 
if the government undertakes measures e.g. partial or complete ban on resorting to strikes by 
the trade unions, reformation of employment security laws to curb union power, the unions’ 
power to mark up wages over the supply of labour decreases. The consequence would, 
therefore, be a fall in the unionized wage. Thus, labour market reform in the present context 
may be captured in terms of an exogenous reduction in the unionized wage.  
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tAAAPAAAX NLKNKLNLKNKL ˆ)(ˆ))[(
1(ˆ 81323153127131314312 λλλλλλλλλλλλλ ++−++=
                           ]ˆˆ)( 13
*
913331631 KWAAA NLNLKNKL λλλλλλλλ ++++                      (12)                  
and; 
21217124217213
ˆ))[(1(ˆ PAAAAX KNNLKLNL λλλλλλλλλ −−−=            
                                 tAAAA KNNLKLNL ˆ)( 221812521821 λλλλλλλλ −−−−  
  ]ˆ)(ˆ)( 1221
*
321912621921 KWAAAA NLNLKNNLKLNL λλλλλλλλλλλλ −+−−−+         (13)  
where: 
)( 213312321 KNLKNLKNL λλλλλλλλλλ +−=                                                                    (14) 
2
221212322331 )(())[(
1( LKLLNNL
k
LjLiKK SSA λθθθθθλθθθθ −−+= )]
3
3 LKL Sλ+ ;                                                               
)])(()[( 33
2
2212122 LKLLKLLNNL
k
LjLiK SSS
TA λλθθθθλθθ +−−= ; 
)}];(){()[1( 33
3
3
2
232121323 KLLKLLKLLLNNL
k
LjLiLK SSSA θθλλθθθθθλθθθ ++−−=
0)( 1
2
2
2
2
1
1 >++= NLKLLNLLNLkLjLi SSSS θλλλλ ; 
])())[(1( 2221212322334 NKNLNNL
k
NjNiKK SSA λθθθθθλθθθθ −++= ; 
])()[( 22212125 NKNLNNL
k
NjNiK SS
TA λθθθθλθθ −+= ; 
 ])()[( 2221212
3
6 NKNLNNL
k
NjNiK
L SSA λθθθθλθθ
θ −+= ;                                                  (15)   
0)( 1
2
2
2
2
1
1 >++= LNKNNLNNLNkNjNi SSSS θλλλλ ; 
])())()[(1( 21212321
2
1
2
22337
k
KjKiLNNLKLKNNKLKK SSSA λθθθθθλθθθθθθ −−−+= ;              
])()()[( 2121
2
1
2
1228
k
KjKiLNNLKNLKLNKK SSS
TA λθθθθθθλθθ −−−= ;                                                                         
])()()[1( 32121
2
1
2
12239 L
k
KjKiLNNLKNLKLNKKL SSSA θλθθθθθθλθθθ −−−= ;                                                              
0])([ 33
22
2 >++= KLKKNKLKkKjKi SSSS λλλ ; and, 
0)]()([ 222333
3
33 >+++= KNKLKLKLKLKLkKjKi SSSS λθθθλθλ  
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We now define ijkS s. Here
i
jkS is the degree of substitution between factors in sector i , i = 
1,2,3. For example, )/)(/( 11
1 WaaWS LLLL ∂∂≡ , )/)(/( 111 RaaRS LLLN ∂∂≡ etc. 0>ijkS for 
;kj ≠ and, .0<ijjS We note that as the production functions are homogeneous of degree one, 
the factor coefficients, jia s would be homogeneous of degree zero in the factor prices. 
Therefore, the sum of elasticities for any factor of production in any sector with respect to 
factor prices must be zero. For example, for labour in sector 1 we have .0)( 11 =+ LNLL SS All 
other mathematical terms have already been defined in section 2 immediately before the 
formal presentation of the model. 
 
Differentiating equation (7) and using (12) and (13) it is easy to check7 that the stability 
condition in the market for the non-traded input is as follows.  
0)( <∆λ ;                                                                                                                     (16.1) 
where: ])([ 11411312217 AAA NLNLNLNL λλλλλλλλ −−−−=∆                                (16.2) 
Now differentiating (7), using (12) and (13) and simplifying one gets: 
])()[
ˆ
(ˆ 121513122182 NLNLNLNL AAA
tP λλλλλλλλ −−−−∆=    
               ])()[
ˆ
( 131612219
*
NLNLNL AAA
W λλλλλλ −−−∆−   
                           ))(
ˆ
( 131221 NLNLNL
K λλλλλλ −−∆−                                         (17) 
 
Finally, using (17) and colleting terms equation (8) can be rewritten as follows. 
])}()()[{
ˆ
(ˆ 2
2233
12151312218
1 TAAAtW KKKNLNLNLNLN θθθθλλλλλλλλθ
θ +∆
+−−−−−=                                   
            ])}()()[{
ˆ
( 32
2233
131612219
*
1
LK
KK
NLNLNL
N AAAW θθθθθλλλλλλθ
θ −∆
+−−−+    
                      ))(
ˆ
)()(( 1312212233
1
NLNLNLKK
N K λλλλλλθθθθ
θ −−∆++                          (18) 
 
                                                 
7 This has been derived in Appendix II. 
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We are all set to derive and state our results. Depending on the nature of the non-traded input 
produced in sector 2 and the nature of capital mobility between the informal and the formal 
sectors two sub-cases arise. 
 
Sub-case I: Sector 2 produces an agricultural input for the formal sector and hence uses land 
and does not use capital. In this case there is complete mobility of land between the two 
informal sectors while capital is a specific input in sector 3.  These imply that ,, 22 KKa λ  
;1;0 32 == KK λθ and, 2KLS , ,2KNS ,2LKS 2 ,NKS 02 =KKS . Sectors 1 and 2 together form a HOSS 
(Hechscher-Ohlin subsystem).  
 
We assume that sector 2 is more labour-intensive than sector 1. The rationale behind this 
assumption becomes quite clear if one considers rice and cotton (or jute) as the two 
agricultural commodities. The production of rice involves less labour per unit of land vis-à-vis 
the processing of raw cotton/jute for delivery to the textile industry (formal sector). Even at 
the cultivation stage both products require the same labour/land ratio, cotton/jute must go 
through another process of conversion before it can be sent to the textile firms. This additional 
phase of production is likely to make the output of sector 2 labour-intensive.8 This means that 
.0, <λθ  
 
Using the above specifications from (18) it is easy to prove the following proposition.9 
Proposition 1: When the informal sector produces an agricultural input for the formal 
manufacturing sector the informal wage (i) decreases due to removal of the protectionist 
policy; (ii) rises following labour market reform; and, (iii) increases owing to an inflow of 
foreign capital.   
 
Proposition 1 can intuitively be explained as follows. We note that sectors 1 and 2 together 
form a HOSS. Now, an inflow of foreign capital lowers the rate of return to capital as the 
supply of capital rises given its demand. Sector 3 expands and demands more non-traded 
input which in turn raises the price of the input, 2P . This produces a Stolper-Samuelson effect 
in the HOSS leading to an increase in the competitive informal wage and a decrease in the 
return to land as sector 2 is more labour-intensive relative to sector 1. On the other hand, a 
reduction in import tariff reduces the domestic price of commodity 3 and leads to a 
                                                 
8 See Marjit (1991) for details. 
 
9 This has been proved in Appendix II. 
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contraction of this sector. The demand for the non-traded input falls given its supply resulting 
in a decrease in its price. The informal sector wage, W , now falls following a Stolper-
Samuelson effect in the HOSS. Finally, a policy of labour market reform that takes the form 
of a reduction in the unionized wage, *W , helps the formal manufacturing sector (sector 3) to 
save on labour input and enables it to expand which in turn increases its demand for the non-
traded input. This raises the price of the non-traded input which in turn raises the informal 
wage once again following a Stolper-Samuelson effect in the HOSS. 
 
We may consider a special case where sector 2 is land-intensive relative to sector 1 and the 
proportion of the workforce employed in the formal sector is significantly low. All these 
suggest that: ;0;0, <∆>λθ and, .03 ≅Lλ Using these specifications from (18) the 
following proposition can be easily proved.10 
Proposition 2: In the case where the non-traded sector produces an agricultural input the 
informal wage (i) rises following a reduction in import tariff; (ii) falls due to labour market 
reform; and, (iii) rises owing to an inflow of foreign capital if and only if ;0, >λθ and, 
.03 ≅Lλ     
 
Under the necessary and sufficient condition that ;0, >λθ and, 03 ≅Lλ , the policy changes 
produce exactly the opposite effects on the informal wage to what we have derived in 
proposition 1. Policy consequences on the price of the non-traded good remain unaltered. But, 
the price change and the consequent Stolper-Samuelson effect would make the informal wage 
to move in the opposite direction as the informal sector (sector 2) is now land-intensive. It is 
worthwhile to mention that Marjit (2003) has considered this case and obtained the 
counterintuitive effect of a reduction in import tariff on the informal sector wage. 
  
Let us now turn to analyze the other sub-case. 
Sub-case II: Sector 2 produces a non-traded manufacturing input for the formal sector. So it 
uses capital and not land. Land is now specific to sector 1 while capital is perfectly mobile 
between sectors 2 and 3. All these imply that ;1;0,, 1222 == NNNNa λθλ and, 
2
NLS , ,
2
NNS ,
2
LNS
2
,NKS 0
2 =KNS . It is sensible to assume that the formal sector is more capital-
intensive vis-à-vis the non-traded sector (sector 2) in both physical and value terms. 
 
                                                 
10 This has been proved in appendix II. 
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Using the above stipulations and equation (18) the following proposition can now be 
established. 
Proposition 3: In the case where the non-traded informal sector produces a manufacturing 
input for the formal sector the informal wage (i) decreases due to removal of the protectionist 
policy; and, (ii) increases owing to an inflow of foreign capital. On the other hand, a policy of 
labour market reform raises the competitive informal wage if: 
).)(( 33232322 LKKKLL λθθθθθλ +≥    
 
We explain proposition 2 in the following fashion. A policy of trade liberalization lowers the 
domestic price of commodity 3 and leads to a contraction of this sector. Sector 3 now 
demands less capital which in turn lowers the return to capital, r . The demand for the non-
traded input also falls which consequently lowers its price, 2P . Following the contraction of 
sector 3, sector 2 also contracts as its output is used in fixed proportion in the former.  Now a 
fall in r implies that producers in both the manufacturing sectors use more (less) capital-
intensive (labour-intensive) techniques of production than before. Labour is released by these 
two sectors which now goes to sector 1 pressing down the competitive informal wage. On the 
other hand, an inflow of foreign capital leads to a decrease in r and hence an increase in 2P so 
as to satisfy the zero profit condition for sector 3 (equation 3). As the capital stock of the 
economy swells up, both the capital-using sectors expand. It raises the demand for labour in 
the two manufacturing sectors, making less labour available to sector 1 and hence exerts an 
upward pressure on the informal wage. Finally, a decrease in the unionized wage makes it 
possible for the formal sector to save on labour input and raises the effective price of this 
commodity that the producers face. This leads to an expansion of this sector. An expansion of 
sector 3 raises the demand for the non-traded input. The price of the non-traded input, 2P , 
rises as a consequence. The demand for capital also rises in this sector and so would be the 
return to capital. So capital moves out of sector 2 to sector 3. This raises the return to capital 
in sector 2. Given 2P , an increase in r implies a decrease in the informal wage, W (see 
equation (2)). But, as 2P has increased it effectively produces a Stolper-Samuelson effect in 
the two manufacturing sectors and exerting an upward pressure onW (note that sector 2 is 
labour-intensive vis-à-vis sector 3 in value sense). Thus, there are two opposite effects on the 
informal wage,W . The positive effect onW is stronger than the negative effect under the 
sufficient condition as stated in the proposition.  
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4.  Policy implications and concluding remarks 
 
Developing countries have been vigorously implementing liberalization policies in trade and 
investment for the last one and a half decades or so. But, they have been facing enormous 
adjustment costs in their endeavor in implementing such policies, especially in the 
employment front. Empirical evidence points out that the size of the informal sector has 
expanded significantly at the expense of the formal sector and that the problem of 
unemployment has increased over the liberalized regime. This paper has developed a three-
sector general equilibrium model with informal sectors and a non-traded input with a view to 
examine the consequences of different liberalized policies on the informal wage. This analysis 
is extremely important as more than 70 per cent of the workforce in the developing countries 
is employed in the informal sector with wage incomes below or just above the poverty line. 
The theoretical analysis has found that trade liberalization, except in a very special case, 
produces depressing effect on the informal wage while inflows of foreign capital and/or 
structural reforms like deregulating the labour market are likely to produce favourable effects 
on the wage earnings of the poor workers. The latter result is extremely crucial as it explains 
why labour market reform should form an integral constituent of the liberalized economic 
package in the liberalizing countries. Furthermore, these results do not hinge on the nature of 
the capital mobility between the formal and informal sectors and, therefore, are robust.  So, 
removal of the protectionist policy, which aims at reduction of commodity market distortion, 
a common characteristic of the developing countries, must be undertaken very cautiously as it 
is likely to hurt the interest of the poorer group of the workforce. On the other hand, 
investment and labour market reforms should be encouraged. Therefore, the liberalizing 
countries should not attempt in implementing all reforms at a very brisk pace, without pre-
calculating their possible outcomes. A proper balance among various policies should be made 
considering the institutional, technological and trade related characteristics in order to protect 
the interests of the poor informal sector workers. Making this balance is utterly essential for 
attaining the ILO’s (2006) objective of promotion of decent work for all. 
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Appendices: 
 
Appendix I: Derivation of stability condition in the market for the non-traded input 
 
As commodity 2 is internationally non-traded its market must clear domestically through 
adjustments in its price, 2P . 
The stability condition in the market for commodity 2 requires that 
0)/)(( 222 <− dPXXd D . This implies around equilibrium, initially, 22 XX D = . Thus, 
.0))ˆ/ˆ()ˆ/ˆ(( 2222 <− PXPX D                                                                                          (A.1) 
Now the demand for the non-traded input is given by 
.3232 XaX
D = Differentiating this equation one gets 
.ˆˆ 32 XX
D = Using (13) one can find: 
))(1()ˆ
ˆ
( 121712421721
2
3 AAAA
P
X
KNNLKLNL λλλλλλλλλ −−−=                                   (A.2) 
On the other hand, from (12) it follows that: 
))(1()ˆ
ˆ
( 713131431
2
2 AAA
P
X
NLKNKL λλλλλλλ ++=                                                       (A.3) 
 
Using (A.1) – (A.3) we find the following stability condition for equilibrium in the market for 
commodity 2. 
0])()[1( 11411312217 <−−−− AAA NLNLNLNL λλλλλλλλλ ; 
i.e. 
0)( <∆λ ;                                                                                                                        (16.1) 
where: ])([ 11411312217 AAA NLNLNLNL λλλλλλλλ −−−−=∆                                   (16.2) 
 
 
Appendix II:  Two possible cases 
 
Depending on the nature of the non-traded input produced by sector 2 and the nature of 
capital mobility between the formal and the informal sectors the following two cases are 
possible. 
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Sub-case I: Sector 2 produces an agricultural input for the formal sector and hence uses land 
and does not use capital. These imply that  
,, 22 KKa λ ;1;0 32 == KK λθ and, 2KLS , ,2KNS ,2LKS 2 ,NKS 02 =KKS .                       (A.4) 
As per our assumption that sector 2 is more labour-intensive than sector 1 we have 
.0, <λθ  
 
Using (A.4), the expressions presented in (14) and (15) can be reduced to: 
0)( 1221 <−= NLNL λλλλλ ;                                                                                        (A.5) 
0])()()[1( 33212123
2
2
1
131 <−−+= LKLLNNLLNLLNLK SSSA λθθθθθλλθθ ;                                                                          
;0])/[( 3332 <−= LKLK STA λθ ;0)]()/[( 333333 <+−= KLLKKL SA θθθλ  
;0)]()[1( 22
1
134 <+= NLNNLNK SSA λλθθ ;065 == AA                                              (A.6) 
;0])/[( 33237 <−= KLK SA θθ ;0)/( 338 <−= KKLSA θ                                                                                              
.0)])(/[( 333
3
9 <+−= LKKKLSA θθθ                                                                                                 
 
Using (A.4) – (A.6) it is easy to check from (16.2) that: .0>∆  
 
With the help (A.5) and (A.6) and simplifying from (17) one can write:                                      
])()[
ˆ
(ˆ 313131221
3
3
2 LKNLNLNLNLKL
K
STStP λλλλλλλλθ +−−−∆=    
                (+)                              (−)  
  ])()[)(
ˆ
( 3131221
3
33
3
*
LKNLNLNLKLKL
K
SSW λλλλλλθθθ −−+∆+   
            (+)                                        (−) 
                                            ))(
ˆ
( 131221 NLNLNL
K λλλλλλ −−∆−                (A.7) 
                                                 (+)                    (−) 
 
From (A.7) we find that: 
(i) 02ˆ <P when ;0ˆ <t (ii) 0ˆ2 >P when ;0*ˆ <W and, (iii) 0ˆ2 >P when .0ˆ >K   
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Using (A.5) and (A.6) the expression (18) can be reduced to as follows. 
])()[
ˆ
(ˆ 313131221
31
LKNLNLNLNLKL
N STStW λλλλλλλλθ
θ +−−−∆−=     
             (−)(+)                             (−)    
  ])()[)(
ˆ
( 3131221
3
33
*
1
LKNLNLNLKLKL
N SSW λλλλλλθθθ
θ −−+∆−   
         (−)(+)                                         (−)   
                 ))(
ˆ
( 131221
31
NLNLNL
KN K λλλλλλθ
θθ −−∆+                                 (A.8) 
                                       (−)(+)                        (−)  
 
The following results are evident from (A.8). 
(i) 0ˆ <W when ;0ˆ <t (ii) 0ˆ >W when ;0*ˆ <W and, (iii) 0ˆ >W when .0ˆ >K   
 
A special case:  
 
We consider a special case where sector 2 is land-intensive relative to sector 1 and the 
proportion of the workforce employed in the formal sector is significantly low. These imply 
that:  
;0, >λθ and, .03 ≅Lλ                                                                                                   (A.9) 
Using these specifications from (16.1) one finds that: 
0<∆                                                                                                                                 (A.10) 
 
Now using (A.9) and (A.10) from (18) the following results are obtained: (i) 0ˆ >W when 
;0ˆ <t (ii) 0ˆ <W when ;0*ˆ <W and, (iii) 0ˆ <W when 0ˆ >K . We should note that these 
results hold under the necessary and sufficient conditions that: ,θ  ;0;0 <∆>λ and, 
.03 ≅Lλ    
 
Sub-case II: Sector 2 produces a non-traded manufacturing input for the formal sector. So it 
uses capital and not land. All these suggest that 
;1;0,, 1222 == NNNNa λθλ and, 2NLS , ,2NNS ,2LNS 2 ,NKS 02 =KNS                               (A.11)  
 
Sector 3 is capital-intensive relative to sector 2 in both physical and value terms.  
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Using (A.11) the expressions presented in (11), (14) and (15) can be reduced to as follows. 
 
;0)( 213 <−= LNK θθθθ                                                                                                  (A.12)  
 
0)( 3232 <−= KLLK λλλλλ                                                                                           (A.13) 
2
2
3
23
1
2
2
1
122331 )(())()[(
1( LKL
K
NLKLLNLKK SSSA λθ
θθθλλθθθθ −++=  
                                                                                               0)]33 <+ LKL Sλ                                                       
;0)]()()[( 33
2
2211
2
2
1
122 <+++= LKLLKLLNNLKLLNLK SSSSTA λλθθθλλθθ                                                                
2
23211
2
2
1
1323 {)()[
1( LKLLLNNLKLLNLLK SSSA λθθθθλλθθθ ++=  
                                                                                     ;0)}]( 33
3
3 <++ KLLKL S θθλ  
;0)(;0)(;0]))[(1(
1
23
6
1
2
5
1
22334 <=<=<+= θ
θθ
θ
θθθθθ
NLKLNLK
NLKK
SASTASA    (A.14) 
;0)]())[(1( 33
2
22231
2
2122337 <+++= KLKKLKLNKLKNKK SSSA λλθθθλθθθθθ  
;0)]()[( 33
2
221
2
2128 <++= KLKKLKLNKLKNK SSSTA λλθθλθθθ  
;0}])({)[1( 22333
3
321
2
21239 <+++= KLKLKLKLKLNKLKNKL SSSA λθθθλθθλθθθθ  
 
Using (A.11) – (A.14), from (16.2) one finds that .0>∆  
 
Taking the help of (A.12) – (A.14) and collecting terms from (17) one can write 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 21
)()()[
ˆ
(ˆ 22
2
21
11
212 KLKLKLNNLLNKL SSSS
tTP λλθθλθ +++∆−=  
            (+)(−)                                                   (+) 
                                                                 )}]({ 32
3
3
3
321 LLKLKLKLLN SS λλλλθθ +++  
                                                                                              (+) 
  )()()[*
ˆ
( 22
2
2231
11
231 LKLKLKLLNNLLNKLL SSSS
W λλλθθθθλθ +++∆+  
      (+)(−)                                                (+) 
                 )])(( 323
3
33321 KLLKLKLKLLN SS λλλθθθθ +++  ))(
ˆ
( 32
2
LL
L
K λλθ +∆+        (A.15) 
                                                       (+)                                          (+) 
 
From (A.15) it follows that: 
(i) 02ˆ <P when ;0ˆ <t (ii) 0ˆ2 >P when ;0*ˆ <W and, (iii) 0ˆ2 >P when .0ˆ >K   
 
Finally, using (A.11) – (A.14) and simplifying equation (18) may be rewritten as follows. 
)]())()[(
ˆ
(ˆ 33
2
2
3
3
2
232
1
LKLLKLKLKKLKLL
N SSSStTW λλλλλλθ
θ ++++∆−=  
             (+)(−)                                                  (+) 
                    ))(
ˆ
( 32 LL
K λλ +∆+  
                         (+)       (+) 
      })({)[
)(
*ˆ
( 32332232
2
2312
1
LKKLKLKLKLN
N SW λθθθλθθλθθθ
θ +−∆+  
          (+)(+)                                     
         )}()){(( 3223233232233
3
321 LKLKLLKKKKLKLN S λθθλθθλθθθθλθθ −+++  
          )}]({)( 2332233
3
321
2
23321 θθθθθλθθλθθθθ ++++ KKKLKLLNLKLKLLN SS         (A.16) 
 
From (A.16) the following results trivially follow. 
(i) 0ˆ <W when ;0ˆ <t (ii) 0ˆ >W when 0ˆ >K . Also, (iii) 0ˆ >W when 0*ˆ <W if  
).)(( 33232322 LKKKLL λθθθθθλ +≥  
 
